To facilitate the transformation of the German economy from the traditional manufacturing industries towards emerging new technologies, a new segment of the Frankfurt exchange was introduced in 1997 -Der Neue Markt. This study provides evidence that not only did many new firms obtain funding from the Neuer Markt, but that for the first time in recent history, Germany succeeded in enabling smaller firms to grow faster than larger firms. This suggests that the new policies were not only successful in promoting a new type of firm that otherwise might not exist, but in transforming the sources of growth and innovation within the German economy. JEL Classification Codes: (O3, O4, L25)
--A company like Microsoft would never have a chance in
 Germany, Joschka Fischer, German Foreign Minister, in 1995 1 
Introduction
Ever since the post-world war II era, the rest of the world has associated Germany with remarkable economic prosperity and stability, providing both high employment and wages. The German model of a social market economy had generated a Wohlstand, or standard of living, that generated not only the material wealth found on the other side of the Atlantic, but also the high degree of social services and security found elsewhere on the European continent. This was reflected by an unemployment rate below one percent during the 1950s and 1960s, and which still remained at 0.5 percent as recently as 1970.
However, by the 1990s, this era of German prosperity with its assumed low rates of unemployment had clearly ended. By the middle of the 1990s, unemployment had reached double digits, reaching 11.4 percent in 1997 and 11.1 percent in 1998, which resulted from sluggish growth, leading policy makers to search for new policy solutions.
The high-technology entrepreneurial sector in places such as Silicon Valley that had helped the U.S. to more than offset unprecedented corporate downsizing, had eluded Germany. While the American entrepreneurial revolution was fuelled by plentiful venture capital, angel capital and informal capital, the highly restrictive and traditional financial institutions seemingly pre-empted the possibility of developing high-technology startups in Germany.
A policy response to German stagnation was to create a new institution capable of channeling investment funds into the development of small high growth technology firms -Der Neue Markt, which was founded in 1997. 2 The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the Neuer Markt succeeded in helping to create fundamentally different firms, The recent reorganization of Neuer Markt firms into "Premier" and "Domestic
Standard" segments this year, while viewed by some as evidence of a failed experiment, acutally underscores the need to empirically examine what impact, if any, it had on hightechnology firm creation and growth in Germany.
Results of this study provide a marked contrast with findings for the U.S. (Caves, 1998 and Sutton, 1997) , where smaller firms have been found to exhibit systematically higher rates of growth than their larger counterparts both in the last few decades, as well as today. In fact he high growth provided by U.S. small enterprises has been so crucial as 
The Mittelstand Paradox in Germany
German unification in 1989 accelerated the process of globalization by enabling countries to participate in the global economy which had previously been excluded. This globalization combined with the telecommunications revolution led to the demise in the traditional sources of German comparative advantage in -highly skilled manufacturing industries. Pressed to maintain competitiveness in these traditional industries, where economic activity can be easily transferred across geographic space to access lower production costs, the largest and most prominent German companies deployed two strategic responses.
this time period.
The first was to offset greater wage differentials between Germany and low-cost locations by increasing productivity through the substitution of technology and capital for labor. The second was to locate new plants and establishments outside of Germany. What both strategic responses had in common was that the German flagship companies downsized the amount of employment in the domestic economy. 4 As Table 1 shows, between 1991 and 1995 manufacturing employment in German plants decreased by 1,307,000 while it increased in foreign subsidiaries by 189,000 (BMWi, 2000) . In the chemical sector, the decrease of domestic employment was 80,000, while 14,000 jobs were added by German chemical companies in plants located outside of Germany. In electrical engineering employment in German plants decreased by 198,000. In automobiles employment in Germany decreased by 161,000, while 30,000 jobs were added outside of Germany.
5 Table 1 here 4 For example, Siemens increased the amount of employment outside Germany by 50 percent, from 108,000 in 1984/85 to 162,000 in 1994/95. Over the same time period it decreased the amount of employment in Germany by 12 percent, from 240,000 to 211,000.Volkswagen increased the amount of employment in foreign countries by 24 percent, from 78,000 in 1984 to 97,000 in 1994. Over the same time period, it decreased employment in Germany by 10 percent, from 156,000 to 141,000. Similarly, Hoechst increased the number of jobs outside of Germany by 9 percent, from 78,925 in 1984 to 92,333 in 1994 . The number of Hoechst employees in Germany fell over that same period by 26 percent, from 99,015 to 73,338. And BASF increased employment in foreign countries by 34 percent, from 29,966 in 1984 to 40,297 in 1994 . Domestic employment by BASF fell by 17 percent over that same time period, from 85,850 to 65,969 (Audretsch, 1999) . 5 The reaction of the German public was to accuse German firms of not fulfilling their social contract. .As one of the leading newspapers, Die Zeit, accused German industry, "When Profits Lead to Ruin -More Profits and More Unemployment: Where is the Social Responsibility of the Firms?", "Wenn der Profit zur Pleite fuehrt: Mehr Gewinne -und mehr Arbeitslose: Wo bleibt die soziale Verantwortung der Unternehmer?" Die Zeit, 2 February, 1996, p. 1.
During the post-war era, there were several institutional features of the German financial system that sharply contrasted to that practiced in the United States and the United Kingdom, both of which may have impacted the extent to which enterprises are able to obtain access to finance (Vitols, 1998; and Deeg, 1998) . Companies in Germany typically relied almost exclusively upon banks for external finance. During the 1970s and 1980s, the debt-equity ratios of small-and medium-sized companies averaged 1 to 1, with 80 percent of the financing coming from internal sources (Audretsch and Elston, 1997) .
By contrast, in the U.S., the comparable debt-equity ratios for small firms during this period was around 1 to 4, showing a substantially greater reliance on equity financing.
A second important feature of the German banking institutions has been the close ties between banks and firms. Not only are German banks legally allowed to own equity, underwrite shares, extend loans and exercise proxy votes, but Fohlin (2000) shows how long-term relationships between banks and the enterprises they finance are historically more the rule and less the exception in Germany. These long-term relationships have resulted in financing practices protecting the status quo interests of the large incumbent firms and entire industries (Deeg, 2000) . This has meant that while financing has been provided to small-and medium-sized enterprises, bank-based financing has been biased towards the status quo firms, industries and sectors.
In addition, alternative forms of finance, such as equity markets have been limited in Germany. Germany's equity markets remain both small and underdeveloped when compared to U.S. markets. For example, in 1989 only 501 out of 2,682
Aktiengesellschaften (AG), or stock-held firms, were publicly held. An important and striking institutional feature of German corporate governance is that most stock held firms --around 80 percent in 1989--were not listed on the public stock exchange (Audretsch and Elston, 2001) . Without equity finance, these small German firms have been more dependent on banks for external funding than their U.S. counterparts.
These institutional features of Germany have resulted in a paradox with respect to the system of financing for the German Mittelstand. On the one hand, the development of a finely layered network of institutions, linking together financial institutions, governments, and private firms has resulted in a system of finance in Germany which has served as a model for providing funds to small-and medium-sized enterprises. Not only was the Mittelstand the backbone of the German economy -the underlying reason behind subsequent rise to economic power-but it also appeared to have a played a more important role in German economic development than in either the United States or the United Kingdom.
On the other hand, while the German Mittelstand was the basis for Germany's economic success, one aspect became notably lacking by the 1990s -the lack of small high-technology companies in the emerging industries such as software, biotechnology, and computers. In summary, while the German institutions of finance and corporate governance succeeded in generating a successful Mittlestand for the traditional manufacturing industries, they were unsuccessful in providing finance for firm startups in the new emerging technology sectors. (p. 6) and that the central pillar of the innovation promotion is the programme "Venture capital for small technology-based firms", because "The majority of new jobs are being created by small and medium-sized enterprises" (p. 18). 7 For example, Der Spiegel (no. 5, 1994, pp. 82-83) observed that, "Global structural change has had an impact on the German economy that only a short time ago would have been unimaginable: Many of the products, such as automobiles, machinery, chemicals and steel are no longer competitive in global markets. And in the industries of the future, like biotechnology and electronics, the German companies are barely participating." steadily inched the Neuer Markt downward leaving the index well below the opening value of 1000 points -far from the maximum value of 8559.32 points reached on March 10, 2000. 8 The reasons for the subsequent and potentially ongoing plunge of world equity markets, including the Neuer Markt are beyond the scope of this study, but provide potentially fertile ground for future studies. Table 2 shows, the amount of capital raised on the Neuer Markt increased from 456 million € in 1997 to 13,689 million € in 2000. Table 2 here
New Policies and Institutions: Der Neue Markt
Similarly, Figure 1 shows that the number of firms listed on the Neuer Markt increased dramatically between 1997 and 2001. of a short-term exemption period during which they may follow reporting requirements from the HGB only. In addition, they must report in English and German quarterly.
Has The Firm Size-Growth Relationship Changed?
A series of survey articles by Sutton (1997) , Caves (1998) and Geroski (1995) summaries the findings from a plethora of empirical studies examining the relationship between firm size and growth. A stylized result (Geroski, 1995) emerging from this literature is that, when a broad spectrum of firm sizes is included in samples of U.S.
enterprises, smaller firms exhibit systematically higher growth rates than their larger counterparts. 10 The growth advantage of small and new firms vis-à-vis large enterprises has been shown to be even greater in high technology industries (Audretsch, 1995) .
However, the links between firm size and growth and firm age and growth have been found to be much more ambiguous for Germany. While some studies have found no systematic relationship to exist between firm size and growth (Wagner, 1992) still other have actually found a positive relationship (Burgel, Fier, Licht and Murray, 2000) . Only a few studies have found have results similar to the U.S. (Almus and Nerlinger, 2000; and Harhoff, Stahl and Woywode, 1998) . Thus, the evidence that firm size was positively related to growth for Germany poses a stark and striking contrast to the U.S. economy.
As emphasized in Section 3, the Neuer Markt was created to promote the and younger technology based--than had previously existed in Germany.
Three comprehensive surveys (Sutton, 1997; Caves, 1998; and Geroski, 1995) identify that a common formulation of the relationship between firm size and growth, involves a decomposition of the present size of firm i in period into the product of a "proportional effect" and the initial firm size as:
where (1 + ε t ) denotes the proportional effect for firm i in period t. Here the random shock ε t is assumed to be identically and independently distributed. Taking the natural log and using the fact that for small ε , ln (1 + ε) ≈ ε t, we derive the following relationship, ln (Size i,t) = ln(Size i,0) + ∑ t k=1 ε it which as t→∞ results in a distribution which is approximately log normal with properties that ln (Size i,t) ∼ N( tµ ε , tσ 2 ε ).
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Firm growth can then be measured as the difference between the log of the number of employees as:
Growth i,tn-t1 = ln(S i,tn ) -ln(S i,t1 ) / (t n -t 1 )
where the difference in Size for firm i between the current period t n and the initial period t 1 equals Growth over that period.
Based on Hall (1987) and Evans (1987) the empirical growth equation for testing the hypothesis that initial firm size and impacts firm growth can then be specified: 
where growth i,tn-t1 for firm i in period (t n -t 1 ) is a function of size, size 2 , age, and ε it a stochastic error term. As Sutton (1997) , Caves (1998) and Geroski (1995) report, the statistically consistent and compelling results emerging from estimating this equation are negative coefficients for the size and age effects.
The Role of Liquidity Constraints
One of the reasons why growth may vary across firm sizes is the result of differential access to finance. There are several reasons why liquidity constraints become more severe as firm size decreases. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) note that unlike most markets, the market for credit is exceptional in that the price of the good --the rate of interest, is not necessarily at a level that equilibrates the market. They attribute this to the fact that interest rates influence not only demand for capital but also the risk inherent in different classes of borrowers. As the interest rate rises, so does the riskiness of borrowers, leading suppliers of capital to rationally decide to limit the quantity of loans they make at a particular of interest rate. Further, the amount of information about an enterprise is generally not neutral with respect to size. Petersen and Rajan (1992, p. 3) point out that "Small and young firms are most likely to face this kind of credit rationing.
Most potential lenders have little information on the managerial capabilities or investment opportunities of such firms and are unlikely to be able to screen out poor credit risks or to have control over a borrower's investments." Jaffe and Russell (1976) show that credit rationing will occur if lenders are unable to identify the quality or risk associated with particular borrowers. This phenomenon is also analogous to the lemons argument advanced by George Akerloff (1970) . In effect, the existence of asymmetric information prevents the suppliers of capital from engaging in price discrimination between riskier and less risky borrowers.
But, as Diamond (1991) argues, the risk associated with any particular loan is also not neutral with respect to the duration of the relationship -which is of particular importance in a bank-based country such as Germany. This is because information about the underlying risk inherent in any particular customer is transmitted over time. Theory suggests that with experience, a lender will condition the risk associated with any class of customers by characteristics associated with the individual customer.
The purpose of including a measure of firm liquidity into the empirical model is two-fold. First, as explained above, by adding this measure we are able to examine the degree to which a firm's growth is impacted by liquidity constraints. A second interpretation, however, is that by holding liquidity constraints constant, we can focus on the relationship of interest -that of firm size to growth controlling for the liquidity constraints of the firm. We are able then to separate out the size effects into two factors, those which stem from financial size effect and those from other real size effects. This will allow us to distinguish then whether firm size may promote growth simply because larger firms have better access to capital or 2) whether other size effects related to firm life-cycle, economies of scale and scope, or other non-financial factors of importance.
Firm cash flows are used as a proxy of liquidity constraints of the firm in much the same way that they are introduced in empirical models in the investment literature.
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The rationale for these models is that once we move away from the perfect capital markets world, we find that both financial and real decisions matter to the firm. Liquidity problems, often exacerbated by asymmetry in information between suppliers of finance and firms for example, will influence real firm decisions such as investment in capital or labour -and by definition then, firm growth. We expect these problems to be particularly severe for smaller and younger firms with limited access to capital and little in the way of physical capital to use as collateral to secure debt.
An alternative model which controls for other factors related to growth including firm liquidity, variations in accounting year reporting, and industry effects can be specified as: 
where growth of firm i is a function of initial firm size, size 2 , and age --the number of years since the firm's IPO. CF, or cash flow, represents the proxy for the liquidity constraints of the firm, and ε a stochastic error term. We can also control for industry effects by using a vector of industry dummies D ind , and a vector of interactive dummies 12 For detailed description of the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the liquidity constrained investment models see for example, Fazarri, Hubbard and Peterson (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, (1991) , Elston (1993 ), or Bond et. al (2003 .
which controls for both macro shocks and accounting year differences in annual reports D acctg .
Dummies for accounting year scheme were constructed because some firms reported annual figures for a January-December accounting year while 70 firms had other accounting years including July-June. For firms with an end of calendar year accounting scheme one set of time dummies was created for each year, and for firms with any other than an end of year accounting another set of time dummies were created for each year.
Regressions were run without an intercept term to account for the inclusion of these mutually exclusive dummies in the model.
Measurement Issues
The firm level data for the Neuer Markt firms comes from three sources --the Hoppenstedt database, Deutsche Bundesbank data sources, and publicly available data from the web, which in total comprise 820 observations but not a balanced panel. The there were no firm deaths, and therefore there should be no bias in estimates due to entry and exit of firms during this sample period used in this analysis. 13 For the older traditional firms in the Bonn Data, 99 percent of the firms survived throughout the entire period, so again selection is not an issue.
The measure of firm size follows the most prevalent form in the plethora of studies linking size to growth reviewed by Sutton (1997) , Caves (1998) and Geroski (1995) , is the number of employees in the firm at the beginning of the sample period.
Age is calculated for all firms in the sample. The oldest firm listed on the Neuer Markt, PSIAG Gesellschaft was incorporated in 1979, while the youngest firms in the Neuer Markt database are less than one year old. 281 firms were less than 2 years old, while there were 60 firms at least two years old.
The firm's cash flow was calculated by totaling the firm's cash, checks, and accounts at banks as reported on their balance sheet under the HGB accounting rules in thousands of Euro. 14 Heteroscedastic consistent parameter estimates for regressions were obtained using White's (1980) approach, and are reported in the empirical results. 
Tables 4 and 5 here Empirical Results
In Table 6 (1996) . 15 In addition, a positive relationship between firm age and growth is found for the high R&D industries. Thus, the results for the traditional firms in Germany provide a stark contrast with the benchmark results found for the U.S. (Sutton, 1997; Caves, 1998; and Geroski, 1995) that firm size and firm age are both negatively related to firm growth.
However, these results are considerably different for the Neuer Markt firms. In particular, firm size is found to have a negative and statistically significant relationship 14 When data was reported in DM it was converted to Euro using the fixed exchange rate of 0.5102. 15 The survey revealed that chemicals (including pharmaceuticals), machinery, motor vehicles, electronics, and instruments, cameras, watches and clocks had the highest R&D intensities as well as the highest share of firms with R&D budgets and in-house R&D laboratories.
with growth. In addition, firm age is found to have a positive and statistically significant relationship with firm growth. The impact of age disappears once we control for cash flow.
These results suggest that the Neuer Markt firms are considerably different than the firms from the older traditional manufacturing sample in that it is the smaller firms which exhibit higher growth rates. Unlike the traditional manufacturing firm sample, the Neuer Markt firms exhibit growth patterns more similar to the Stylized Results from the United States and other developed countries. While the larger firms exhibited higher growth rates for the traditional firms, the smaller enterprises exhibit systematically higher growth rates for the Neuer Markt firms.
Because of the high correlation among some of the explanatory variables for the Neuer Markt firms, which raises multicollinearity concerns, Table 7 indicate that what previously has been inferred to be an impact of firm age on growth may, in fact, reflect the superior access of older firms to capital. Tables 7 and 8 here constitutes a small firm. Regardless of the partitioning criterion for size, the finding that smaller firms grow faster remains robust. This suggests that the results are not dependent upon observations from a particular portion of the firm-size spectrum.
Summary and Conclusions
In an effort to facilitate the transformation of the German economy away from Second, it may be that such small high growth new technology firms existed but simply were not publicly listed and thus eluded the radar screen of our database. While unlikely, we cannot exclude such a possibility, as they would have had to have been sufficiently hidden to also evade notice of policy makers concerned with Germany's inability to transform its economy.
Third, the results of this paper provide no indication of the extent to which the type of entrepreneurial activity being created by Germany's Neuer Markt has influenced or spilled over to the rest of the economy. While this no doubt remains the major policy goal, at least one thing is clear from the results of this study -the Neuer Markt has succeeded in providing a new platform enabling Germany to achieve something that had previously been unattainable --the emergence of new high technology sectors driven by the small high growth companies listed on the Neuer Markt. Industrial forensics on the causes of death are important because the implications for adapting successful future policy depends on the sources of the problems facing the firm.
Inefficient and inappropriate technologies and technological applications will be forced 16 The small but growing literature on small business innovation research does not necessarily consider delisting a sign of firm failure. Firms may no longer be listed because they have merged, changed names, moved to other exchanges, etc. In addition, key personnel and technologies may have moved on to other out of a well functioning market -especially during early industry shakedowns periods.
Perhaps sustainable long-term growth will result from the inevitable economic recovery which will eventually lift all ships and allow the Neuer Markt to evolve to a more stable maturity.
Future studies should also explore what other mechanisms can be employed to assist the development of emerging technologies and start-up firms, including the potential role of government as venture capitalist.
Addressing these questions will be central to formulating the policies that will guide
Germany out of its current economic stagnation and restore a high growth performance.
Unless such policies promoting the transformation of Germany away from traditional manufacturing towards knowledge and technology based industries are considered, Germany will remain burdened by alarmingly high rates of unemployment and low growth. As this paper demonstrates, under the right set of policies and institutions, Germany is able to generate high-growth firms in the emerging technology and knowledge sectors.
firms rendering the original firm insolvent, yet the innovation as a result of the initial funding was "successful" by some measure. All data for means is in levels. Standard deviation is in parenthesis. Number of employees is only available for 304 observations, therefore firm Size also.
Small firms have less than 313 employees, Large have 313 or more. Age is measured from date of incorp.
Growth is measured as level differences in number of employees (et -e t-1 ), % growth is growth divided by et-1. Regression 1 is based on Gibrat (1931). Regression 2 is based on Hall (1987 ) & Evans (1987 . Because of mulitcollinearity in Regression 3,4 , parsimonious models are represented in regressions 5,6.
All regressions are corrected for heteroscedasticity and control for industry and year effects.
t-statistic is reported in parenthesis and a * indicates statistical significance of coefficient at the 5% level. 
